Topics in Dynamic Public Finance

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1 Optimal unemployment insurance (UI)

There is a large literature of optimal unemployment insurance. The basic issue is how to provide the most efficient unemployment insurance when there is a moral hazard problem. This is arising from an assumption that unemployed individuals can affect the probability they find (and accept) a job offer. However, it is costly for the worker to increase this probability, e.g., because of effort costs, reduced reservation wages or opportunity costs of time.

1.1 The semi-static approach to optimal UI

The basic idea in Baily and Chetty is to simplify the dynamic problem into a static one. This makes the model simple and tractable also when savings is allowed. An important lesson is that when savings is allowed, we can use the drop in consumption at unemployment as a measure of the welfare loss associated with unemployment. In a dynamic model, this does not work when there is no market for savings. Why? The trade-off faced by the planner is to balance the loss of welfare associated with unemployment against the negative effect on search induced by UI.

1.1.1 The simplest model following Baily

- In the first period, the individual works and chooses how much to consume of the income, normalized to unity, and how much to save.

- In the beginning of the second period, the individual becomes unemployed with probability $1 - \alpha$ and otherwise keeps his job.
• During the second period, the individual can determine how long it takes to find a job by choosing the reservation wage \( y_n \) and costly search effort \( c \). A share \( \beta = \beta(c, y_n) \) of the second period is spent working in the new job.

• While unemployed, the individual gets UI-benefits \( b \). These are paid by taxes on workers.

• Agents have access to a market for precautionary (buffer stock) savings.

• Both the unemployment duration and the wage upon rehiring is non-stochastic.

Total disposable income in second period if laid off is therefore the non-stochastic value

\[
(1 - \beta) (b - c) + \beta y_n (1 - \tau) \equiv y_l.
\]

In first periods, individuals decide how much to save, \( s \). Interest rate and subjective discount rate is normalized to zero. If an individual gets laid off, he consumes his resources, i.e., his disposable income plus savings.

Welfare is

\[
V = u(1 - \tau - s) + \alpha u(1 - \tau + s) + (1 - \alpha) (u(y_l + s)).
\]

Government budget constraint is

\[
(1 + \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \beta y_n) t = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) b.
\]

\[\Rightarrow b = \frac{(1 + \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \beta y_n)}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)} \tau \equiv \mu \tau\]
Denoting the endogenous total income by $Y \equiv 1 + \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \beta y_n$, this implies

$$b = \frac{Y}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)^\tau} \equiv \mu \tau,$$

where we note that $\mu$ is not a constant, but depends on individual choices of $y_n$ and $c$ and thus indirectly on taxes and benefits. Given the budget constraint and individual choices, we can therefore write $\mu = \mu(\tau)$ (provided there is a solution, which is not necessarily true for all $\tau$. Explain!)

Note that in first best, $c$ should be chosen to satisfy

$$(y_n + c) \beta_c = 1 - \beta$$

since social income is

$$-(1 - \beta (y_n, c)) c + \beta (y_n, c) y_n$$

implying that the marginal gain of a marginal unit of effort is $\beta_c (y_n + c)$ and the cost is $1 - \beta$.

The individual instead gains,

$$y_n (1 - \tau) + c - b$$

so the private value of search is lower. Similarly, an increase in $y_n$ has benefits $\beta$ and costs $-(y_n + c) \beta_{y_n}$. While private benefits are $(1 - \tau) \beta$ and private costs $-(y_n (1 - \tau) + c - b) \beta_{y_n}$.
The wedges between private and social costs/benefits imply that both choices will be distorted in second best.

We can now write

\[ V = u(1 - \tau - s) + \alpha u(1 - \tau + s) + (1 - \alpha)(u((1 - \beta)(\mu(\tau) - c) + \beta y_n(1 - \tau) + s)) \]

\[ V = V(c, y_n, s, \mu, \tau) \]

The optimal UI system maximizes solves

\[ \max_{\tau} V(c, y_n, s, \mu(\tau), \tau) \]

Although, \(c, y_n, s\) are affected by \(\tau\), these effects need not be taken into account since by individual optimality,

\[ V_c = V_{y_n} = V_s = 0. \]

This is the envelope theorem. Therefore, the first order condition for maximizing \(V\) by choosing \(\tau\) is

\[ \frac{dV}{d\tau} = V_\mu \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} + V_\tau = 0, \]

where

\[ V_\mu = (1 - \alpha)u'(c_u)(1 - \beta)\tau \]

\[ V_\tau = -u'(c_1) - au'(c_2) - (1 - \alpha)u'(c_u)\beta y_n + (1 - \alpha)u'(c_u)(1 - \beta)\mu, \]
where \( c_1 = 1 - \tau - s \) is first period consumption, \( c_2 = 1 - \tau + s \) is second period consumption if the job is retained and \( c_u = (1 - \beta)(\mu \tau - c) + \beta y_n (1 - \tau) + s \) is second period consumption if the individual lost his job.

Note that by individual savings optimization (the Euler equation)

\[
\frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_u)} = \frac{u'(c_2)}{(1 - \alpha) u'(c_u)}
\]

implying

\[
\begin{align*}
V_r &= -u'(c_1) - (u'(c_1) - (1 - \alpha) u'(c_u)) - (1 - \alpha) u'(c_u) \beta y_n + (1 - \alpha) u'(c_u) (1 - \beta) \mu \\
&= -2u'(c_1) + (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta y_n + (1 - \beta) \mu) u'(c_u).
\end{align*}
\]

Approximating

\[
u'(c_1) \approx u'(c_u) + u''(c_u) \Delta c
\]
where \( \Delta c \equiv c_1 - c_u \) is the fall in consumption if becoming unemployed. The first order condition is then

\[
0 = (1 - \alpha) u'(c_u) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} - 2 (u'(c_u) + u''(c_u) \Delta c)
+ (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta y_n + (1 - \beta) \mu) u'(c_u)
\]

\[
2 \left(1 + \frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c\right) = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} + (1 - \alpha) \left(1 - \beta y_n + (1 - \beta) \frac{Y}{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta)}\right)
\]

\[
2 \left(1 + \frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c\right) = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} + (1 - \alpha) \left(1 - \beta y_n + \frac{Y}{1 - \alpha}\right)
\]

\[
2 \left(1 + \frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c\right) = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} + 2 \left(1 - \beta y_n + \frac{1 + \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \beta y_n}{(1 - \alpha)}\right)
\]

\[
2 \left(1 + \frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c\right) = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau} + 2 \frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta) \frac{d\mu}{d\tau}
\]

Using the definition

\[
\mu \equiv \frac{b}{\tau} = \frac{Y}{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta)}
\]

we get

\[
\frac{u''}{u'} \Delta c = \frac{\tau d\mu}{\mu \frac{d\mu}{d\tau}}
\]

\[
-R_c \Delta c = E_{\mu, t} Y
\]

where \( E_{\mu, t} \) is the elasticity of \( \mu \) with respect to taxes and \( R_c \) the relative risk aversion coefficient. Recall that \( \mu \) is the ratio between benefits and taxes should be interpreted as
the ratio between employment and unemployment.

Note that we should not interpret $Y$ as the aggregate level of income since we have normalized the pre-unemployment income to unity. Instead, it is a measure of employment. Setting $y_n \approx 1, Y \approx 1 + \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \beta$ which is the time people work. In this simple model, this is value is overstated since no unemployment occur in the first period. More realistically, it should be close to one, giving

$$R_r \frac{\Delta c}{c} = -E_{\mu,t}$$

The interpretation is that the welfare loss (the LHS) should optimally be given by how elastic the ratio of employment to unemployment is with respect to taxes.

Without moral hazard, $\frac{d\mu}{d\tau} = 0 = E_{\mu,t}$, in which case optimality requires $\Delta c = 0$. With moral hazard, higher taxes tends to reduce $\mu$ since the employment to unemployment falls in in taxes, i.e., $\frac{\Delta c}{c} = E_{\mu,t}$ is negative. Therefore, $\frac{\Delta c}{c} > 0$. We see that $\frac{\Delta c}{c}$ increases if $\frac{\Delta c}{c} = E_{\mu,t}$ is large in absolute terms and falls if risk aversion is large. Baily claims that $E_{\mu,t}$ is in the order $0.15 - 0.4$. With log utility, this is also how much consumption should fall on entering unemployment.

This approach has been generalized by Chetty showing that we can have repeated spells of unemployment, uncertain spells of unemployment, value of leisure, private insurance and borrowing constraints. The model can therefore be extended to evaluate UI reforms. With a more dynamic model, and in particular if capital markets are imperfect, it should be noted that one needs to know how the whole consumption profile is affected by unemployment. The drop at entering unemployment may not be enough. Shimer and Werning (2007), shows that the reservation wage can be used as a summary measure of how bad unemployment is.
In any case, this the model is not suitable to analyze

1. General equilibrium effects like impacts on wages, search spillovers and job creation.

2. Interaction with other taxes-fiscal spillovers.

3. Time varying benefits.

1.2 The dynamic approach with observable savings

The seminal paper by Shavel & Weiss (1979) focuses on the optimal time profile of benefits. It is a simple infinite horizon discrete time model where the aim is to maximize utility of a representative unemployed subject to a government budget constraint. Utility is given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r} \right)^t (u(c_t) - e_t)$$

where $c_t$ is period $t$ consumption and $e_t$ is a privately chosen unobservable effort associated with job search. The subjective discount rate is $r$, which is assumed to coincide with an exogenous interest rate.

It is assumed that the individual has no access to capital markets so $c_t = b_t$ when the individual is unemployed. After regaining employment, the wage is $w$ forever.

When the individual becomes employed he stays employed for ever for simplicity. Agents have no access to credit markets (or equivalently, savings is perfectly monitored and benefits can be made contingent on them) so the planner can perfectly control the consumption of the individual. The moral hazard problem is that individuals can affect the probability of
finding a job. As in Baily (1978), the individual controls both the search effort (here called \( e_t \)) and the reservation wage (here \( w^*_t \)).

Given an effort level \( e_t \), the individual receives one job offer per period with an associated wage drawn from a distribution with a time invariant probability density \( f(w_t, e_t) \). The probability of finding an acceptable job in period \( t \) is thus

\[
p(w^*_t, e_t) = \int_{w^*_t}^{\infty} f(w_t, e_t) \, dw_t
\]

with

\[
p_w(w^*_t, e_t) = -f(w_t, e_t) \leq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad p_e(w^*_t, e_t) > 0
\]

where the latter is by assumption.

Let \( E_t \) be the expected utility of an unemployed individual that choose optimally a sequence \( \{e_{t+s}, w^*_t\}_{s=0}^{\infty} \). Define

\[
u_t = \bar{u}(w^*_t, e_t) \equiv \frac{1 + r}{r} \int_{w^*_t}^{\infty} u(w_t) \frac{f(w_t, e_t)}{p(w^*_t, e_t)} \, dw_t
\]

This is the expected utility from next period, conditional on finding a job this period, which
starts next period. We note that
\[ \tilde{u}_w (w_t^*, e_t) \geq 0 \]
\[ \tilde{u}_e (w_t^*, e_t) \geq 0. \]

The first inequality follows from the fact that conditional on finding a job, wages are higher for higher reservation wages. The second inequality is by assumption, higher search effort leads to no worse distribution of acceptable job offers.

\[ E_t \] satisfies the standard Bellman equation
\[ E_t = \max_{e_t, w_t^*} \left( u (b_t) - e_t + \frac{1}{1 + r} \left( p (w_t^*, e_t) \tilde{u} (w_t^*, e_t) + (1 - p (w_t^*, e_t)) E_{t+1} \right) \right) \]

The first-order conditions are
\[ e_t; \frac{1}{1 + r} (p_e (w_t^*, e_t) (\tilde{u} (w_t^*, e_t) - E_{t+1}) + p (w_t^*, e_t) \tilde{u}_e (w_t^*, e_t)) = 1 \]
\[ w_t^*; -p_w (w_t^*, e_t) (\tilde{u} (w_t^*, e_t) - E_{t+1}) = p (w_t^*, e_t) \tilde{u}_w (w_t^*, e_t). \]

In the first equation, the LHS is the marginal benefit of higher search effort, coming from a higher probability of finding a job and better jobs if found. These balances the cost which is 1. In the second equation, the LHS is the marginal cost of higher reservation wages, coming from a lower probability of finding a job. The RHS is the gain, coming from better jobs if accepted.
By the envelope theorem
\[ \frac{dE_t}{dE_{t+1}} = \frac{\partial E_t}{\partial E_{t+1}} = \frac{1 - p(w_t^*, e_t)}{1 + r} \]

Now, we will show the important results that anything that reduces next periods unemployment value \( E_{t+1} \) will reduce \( 1 - p(w_t^*, e_t) \), i.e., make hiring more likely. To see this, note that if \( E_{t+1} \) falls,

\[ p_e(w_t^*, e_t) (\tilde{u}(w_t^*, e_t) - E_{t+1}) + p(w_t^*, e_t) \tilde{u}_e(w_t^*, e_t), \text{ and} \]
\[ -p_w(w_t^*, e_t) (u(w_t^*, e_t) - E_{t+1}) \]

both becomes larger if choices are unchanged. In words, the marginal benefit of searching harder and the marginal cost of setting higher reservation wages both increase. Thus, a reduction in \( E_{t+1} \) increase search effort and reduce the reservation wage increasing \( p \).

Now, we can use this to show the key result that benefits should have a decreasing profile.

Proof:

Suppose contrary that \( b_t = b_{t+1} \). Then consider an infinitessimal increase in \( b_t \) financed by an actuarially fair reduction in \( b_{t+1} \), that is

\[ db_t = -\frac{1 - p}{1 + r} db_{t+1} > 0 \]

where \( p(w_t^*, e_t) \) is calculated at the initial (constant) benefit levels. The direct effect on
felicity levels (period utilities) is 

\[ u'(b_t) \, db_t + \frac{1-p}{1+r} u'(b_{t+1}) \, db_{t+1} \]

\[ - u'(b_t) \, \frac{1-p}{1+r} \, db_{t+1} + \frac{1-p}{1+r} u'(b_{t+1}) \, db_{t+1} \]

\[ = 0 \]

since \( u'(b_t) = u'(b_{t+1}) \). By the envelope theorem, we need not take into account changes in endogenous variables when calculating welfare. Therefore, \( E_t \) is unchanged. Since \( u(b_t) \) has increased, \( E_{t+1} \) must have fallen. When calculating the budgetary effects we need to into account the endogenous changes on \( p \).

Let 

\[ B_t = b_t + \frac{1-p}{1+r} b_{t+1} \]

Then, 

\[ dB_t = db_t + \frac{1-p}{1+r} db_{t+1} - \frac{dp}{1+r} b_{t+1} \]

\[ = - \frac{dp}{1+r} b_{t+1} \]

Since \( E_{t+1} \) has fallen, \( dp > 0 \). Thus \( dB_t < 0 \). I.e., the cost of providing utility \( E_t \) has fallen. Equivalently, the insurance is more efficient than the starting point \( b_t = b_{t+1} \).
1.2.1 Extensions

Hopenhayn and Nicolini extend the model by Shavel & Weiss in an important dimension – it enriches the policy space of the government by allowing taxation of workers to be contingent on their unemployment history. It is shown that the government should use this extra way of "punishing" unemployment. The intuition is that relative to the first best, which is a constant unemployment benefit, the government must "punish" unemployment. Doing this by only reducing unemployment benefits is suboptimal, by spreading the punishment of unsuccessful search over the entire future of the individual, a more efficient insurance can be achieved. I.e., lower cost of providing a given utility level. It is shown that this may be quantitatively important. Another contribution is to show that the problem can be formulated in a recursive way with the promised utility as state variable.

Using H&N’s notation, we assume that individuals can choose an unobservable effort level $a_t$ that positively affects the hiring probability. In H&N 1997, it is assumed that $p(a_t)$ is an concave and increasing function and hiring is an absorbing state with a wage $w$ forever. In H&N 2005, it is instead assumed that spells are repeated, with an exogenous separation probability $s$ and

$$p(a) = \begin{cases} p & \text{if } a = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

which is the assumption we make here.

The individual has a utility function

$$E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t (u(c_t) - a_t).$$
Let $\theta_t \in \{0, 1\}$ be the employment status of the individual in period $t$, where $\theta_t = 1$ represents employment. Let $\theta^t = (\theta_0, \theta_1, ... \theta_t)$ be the history of the agent up until period $t$. The history of a person that is unemployed in period $t$ is therefore $\theta^{t-1} \times 0 = (\theta_0, \theta_1, ... \theta_t, 0) \equiv \theta^t_u$, and similarly, $\theta^{t-1} \times 1 \equiv \theta^t_e$.

An allocation is now defined as a rule that assigns consumption and effort as a function of $\theta^t$ at every point in time and for every possible history, $c_t = c(\theta^t)$. We focus on allocations where $a_t = 1$. Individuals must be induced to voluntarily choose $a_t = 1$. Allocations that satisfies this are called incentive compatible allocations.

Given an allocation we can compute the expected discounted utility at every point in time for every possible history, $V_t = V(\theta^t)$. The problem is now to choose the allocation that minimizes the cost of giving some fixed initial utility level to the representative individual. This problem can be written in a recursive way. In period zero, the planner gives a consumption level $c_0$, prescribes an effort level $a_0 (=1)$ and promised continuation utilities $V^e_1 \equiv V(\theta^t_e)$ and $V^u_1 = V(\theta^t_u)$. The problem of the planner in period zero is to minimize costs of providing a given expected utility level $V_0$ subject to the incentive constraint the individual voluntarily chooses $a_0$. The problem is recursive and at any node, costs of providing promised utilities are minimized given incentive constraints.

The problem of the unemployed individual is also recursive. – as unemployed, maximized utility is (the agent only controls $a_t$)

$$V(\theta^t_u) = u(c_t) - 1 + \frac{1}{1 + r} \left( pV(\theta^t_a \times 1) + (1 - p) V(\theta^t_a \times 0) \right)$$
with the incentive constraint

\[
\frac{1}{1+r} p \left( V \left( \theta_{e}^{t+1} \right) - V \left( \theta_{u}^{t+1} \right) \right) \geq 1.
\]

Define \( W (V_t) \) as the minimum cost for the planner to provide a given amount of utility \( V_t \) to an employed. Similarly, let \( C (V_t) \) denote the minimal cost of providing utility \( V_t \) to an unemployed (are these function changing over time?). \( W \) satisfies

\[
W (V_t) = \min_{c_t, V_{e}^{t+1}, V_{u}^{t+1}} c_t - w + \frac{1}{1+r} \left( (1-s) W (V_{e}^{t+1}) + s C (V_{u}^{t+1}) \right)
\]

s.t. \( V_t = u (c_t) + \frac{1}{1+r} \left( (1-s) V_{e}^{t+1} + s V_{u}^{t+1} \right) \),

where \( V_t = V (\theta_e^t) \), \( c_t = c (\theta_e^t) \), \( V_{e}^{t+1} = V (\theta_e^t \times 1) \) and \( V_{u}^{t+1} = V (\theta_e^t \times 0) \).

The constraint can be called promise keeping constraint and has a Lagrange multiplier \( \delta_e^t \).

\( C \) satisfies

\[
C (V_t) = \min_{c_t, V_{e}^{t+1}, V_{u}^{t+1}} c_t + \frac{1}{1+r} \left( p W (V_{e}^{t+1}) + (1-p) C (V_{u}^{t+1}) \right)
\]

s.t. \( \frac{1}{1+r} p \left( V_{e}^{t+1} - V_{u}^{t+1} \right) \geq 1, \)

\( V_t = u (c_t) - 1 + \frac{1}{1+r} \left( p V_{e}^{t+1} + (1-p) V_{u}^{t+1} \right) \).

where \( V_t = V (\theta_u^t) \), \( c_t = c (\theta_u^t) \), \( V_{e}^{t+1} = V (\theta_u^t \times 1) \) and \( V_{u}^{t+1} = V (\theta_u^t \times 0) \).

The first constraint is the incentive constraint, with an associated Lagrange multiplier
\( \gamma_t \) and the second is the promised utility with Lagrange multiplier \( \delta_t^e. \) Given that \( u(c_t) \) is concave and \( u^{-1}(V_t) \) therefore is convex, it is straightforward to show that \( C \) and \( W \) are convex functions.

First order conditions when the agent is employed are

\[
1 = \delta_t^e u'(c_t) \tag{1}
\]

\[
W'(V_{t+1}^e) = \delta_t^c
\]

\[
C'(V_{t+1}^u) = \delta_t^c.
\]

The envelope condition is

\[
W'(V_t) = \delta_t^e = \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} = W'(V_{t+1}^e) = C'(V_{t+1}^u).
\]

The fact that \( W'(V_t) = W'(V_{t+1}^e) \) implies that nothing change for the employed individual as long as his remains employed. Since \( W'(V_t) = C'(V_{t+1}^u) \), marginal marginal utility does not change if the person becomes unemployed, i.e., consumption does not change upon loosing his job either. This is due to the fact that there is no moral hazard problem on the job and full insurance is therefore optimal.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Note that the Lagrange multipliers depends on the history \( \theta_t. \)

\(^2\)From now, I will mostly skip writing out the explicit dependence on history, hopefully without creating confusion.
When the agent is unemployed, the FOC and envelope conditions are

\[ 1 = \delta_t u'(c_t) \]

\[ W'(V_{t+1}) = \gamma_t + \delta_t u' \]

\[ (1 - p) C'(V_{t+1}^u) = -\gamma_t p + \delta_t u'(1 - p) \]

\[ C'(V_t) = \delta_t u. \]

Giving

\[ C'(V_t) = \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} \]  

(2)

\[ W'(V_{t+1}^e) = \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} + \gamma_t \]

\[ C'(V_{t+1}^u) = \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} - \gamma_t \frac{p}{1 - p} \]

**Results**

Since the incentive constraint will bind\(^3\), \( \gamma_t > 0 \) and therefore

\[ W'(V_{t+1}^e) > C'(V_t) > C'(V_{t+1}^u), \]

\[ \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u^t \times 1))} > \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u^t \times 1))} > \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u^t \times 1))} \]

\[ c(\theta_u^t \times 1) > c(\theta_u^t) > c(\theta_u^t \times 0) \]

The result \( C'(V_t) > C'(V_{t+1}^u) \) and the convexity of \( C \) implies that the unemployed

\(^3\)Prove that it must by assuming that it doesn’t and derive the implications of that.
should be made successively worse off \((V_{t+1}^u < V_t)\) as long as he remains unemployed. Since \(C'(V_t) = \frac{1}{u'(c_t)}\) this means that consumption must fall. Furthermore, as the IC-constraint \(\frac{1}{1+r} p (V_{t+1}^e - V_{t+1}^u) \geq 1\) binds, if \(V_{t+1}^u\) keeps falling as long as the unemployed remains unemployed, so must \(V_{t+1}^e\) implying that consumption when becoming employed is lower the longer the agent has been unemployed.

### 1.2.2 The inverse Euler equation.

Multiplying the second line of (2) by \(p\) and the third by \((1 - p)\) and adding them yields,

\[
\frac{1}{u'(c_t)} = pW' (V_{t+1}^e) + (1 - p) C' (V_{t+1}^u).
\]  

(3)

Recall that \(V_{t+1}^e\) is the utility next period if the agent becomes employed, in which case, by (1), \(W' (V_{t+1}^e) = \frac{1}{u'(c_{t+1})}\), where \(c_{t+1} = c(\theta_{t+1})\) denotes consumption in period \(t + 1\) conditional on the getting a job in \(t + 1\) (and the history that led to consumption in \(t\) being \(c_t = c(\theta_t)\)). Similarly, \(V_{t+1}^u\) is next periods utility if the agent remains unemployed. By (2), \(C' (V_{t+1}^e) = \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_{t+1} \times 0))}\), where \(c(\theta_u \times 0)\) denotes consumption if the agent remains unemployed. Equation (3) can therefore be written

\[
\frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u))} = \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u \times 1))} + (1 - p) \frac{1}{u'(c(\theta_u \times 0))}.
\]  

\[
\frac{1}{u'(c_t)} = E_t \frac{1}{u'(c_{t+1})}.
\]
This is the famous "Inverse Euler Equation" (Rogerson, -85 Econometrica)$^4$. Note the difference between this and the standard Euler equation.

\[ u'(c_t) = E_t u'(c_{t+1}). \]

The inverse Euler equation has an important implication. To see this, first note that Jensen’s inequality,

\[ \frac{1}{E_t u'(c_{t+1})} > \frac{1}{E_t u'(c_{t+1})} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{E_t u'(c_{t+1})} < E_t u'(c_{t+1}) \]

since the inverse function is convex. Using this with the Inverse Euler equation gives,

\[ u'(c_t) = \frac{1}{E_t u'(c_{t+1})} < E_t u'(c_{t+1}). \]

The fact that \( u'(c_t) < E_t u'(c_{t+1}) \) in the optimal allocation means that the agent would like to save more if he had access to a capital market with interest rate \( r \), i.e., he is savings constrained. The incentive constraint implies that it is optimal to prevent the individual to save as much as he would like to. Suppose, for example, that utility is logarithmic, then we have

\[ \frac{1}{c_t} = \frac{1}{E_t c_{t+1}} \Rightarrow c_t = E_t c_{t+1}, \]

$^4$With a difference between subjective and market discount rates \( (\rho \text{ and } r, \text{ respectively}) \), we would get

\[ \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} \frac{1 + r}{1 + \rho} = E_t \frac{1}{u'(c_{t+1})}. \]
while the Euler equation, guiding private preferences, implies the privately optimal consumption $c_t^*$ given future consumption is

$$c_t^* = \frac{1}{E_t \left( \frac{1}{c_{t+1}} \right)} < E_t c_{t+1}.$$ 

The intuition is that with more wealth and higher consumption, it is more costly to implement the incentive constraint. Thus, the benevolent planner want to prevent some wealth accumulation. The standard interpretation of this is that when there are incentive constraints, it may be optimal to tax the returns to savings. However, it may turn out that this tax is nevertheless zero in expectation, thus not creating any revenue for the planner/government (Kocherlakota 2005, Econometrica). How can such a tax discourage savings? Hint: risk premium depends on covariance with marginal utility. Explain!

In the logarithmic example, suppose individuals can save and borrow a gross interest rate $r$. Consider a marginal tax rate that depends on employment status and last period individual asset holdings, $\tau^e_{t+1} = \tau^e(a_t)$ and $\tau^u_{t+1} = \tau^u(a_t)$. Then, to have the individual Euler equation satisfied, we need

$$u'(c_t) = \beta E_t u'(c_{t+1}) (1 + r) (1 - \tau(a_t))$$

$$\frac{1}{c_t} = \left( p \frac{1}{c_{t+1}} (1 - \tau^e_{t+1}) + (1 - p) \frac{1}{c_{t+1}} (1 - \tau^u_{t+1}) \right)$$

The inverse Euler equation requires

$$c_t = p c^e_{t+1} + (1 - p) c^u_{t+1}$$
Suppose we consider a zero expected tax rate, i.e., \( p \tau_{t+1}^e = - (1 - p) \tau_{t+1}^u \). Then,

\[
\tau_{t+1}^e = \frac{-(1 - p)}{p} \tau_{t+1}^u. \tag{6}
\]

Using (5) to replace \( c_t \) in (4) together with (6) yields

\[
\tau_{t+1}^u = \frac{p \left( c_{t+1}^e - c_{t+1}^u \right)}{pc_{t+1}^e + c_{t+1}^u (1 - p) E_t c_{t+1}} = \frac{p \Delta c_{t+1}}{E_t c_{t+1}}
\]

\[
\tau_{t+1}^e = -\frac{(1 - p) \left( c_{t+1}^e - c_{t+1}^u \right)}{pc_{t+1}^e + c_{t+1}^u (1 - p)} = -\frac{(1 - p) \Delta c_{t+1}}{E_t c_{t+1}}
\]

These tax rates leads to both the Euler and the inverse Euler equation being satisfied. Note that the tax is \textit{negative} in case the agent becomes employed, while positive if he remains unemployed. That is, it creates a net return that is negatively correlated with marginal utility.

\textbf{Result}: Rendahl (2007)

Consider the repeated H&N economy but where individuals have access to a safe observable bond. It turns out that a tax/transfer that only depends on last period asset holdings and employment status can implement the second-best allocation as the private choices of individuals. Unemployment benefits falls in the asset position of the agent. Over an unemployment spell, unemployment benefits increase but consumption falls.
1.3 The Dynamic approach with unobservable saving

An key assumption in the previous subsection was that the planner can control the consumption level of the individual at all times, the only unobservable is search effort. In reality this assumption seems questionable, given the existence of alternative means of income, capital markets, insurance within an extended family and durable goods.

In this subsection, we assume that the planner cannot control the consumption of the individual – she has access to a perfect market for lending and borrowing at a fixed interest rate and her wealth is unobservable. Of course, this extreme is perhaps equally unrealistic.
and the truth might be somewhere in between.

An immediate problem is that search decisions in this setting might depend on the un-
observable wealth level. Making sure that there is always an incentive to search might then
be unfeasible in general. In one special case, the search decision is not dependent on wealth,
when individuals have CARA utility. This is the way we go here. Furthermore, we simplify
by assuming that search is either one or zero.

Individuals maximize their intertemporal utility, given by

$$E \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} U(c_t) \, dt,$$

where

$$U(c_t) \equiv -e^{-\gamma c_t}.$$  

The purpose of the planner is to maximize time zero welfare of an employed agent subject
to

1. budget balance expressed as actuarial fairness, i.e., that the expected discounted value
   of tax payments equals that of benefits (note that this is not the same as a budget
   balance in a pay-as-you-go system) and to

2. the constraint that agents voluntarily search.

Without loss of generality, we let individuals pay lump-sum taxes, denoted $\tau$, implying
that

$$\dot{A}_t = rA_t + y - c_t - \tau, \quad (7)$$
where \( y = w \) if the individual is employed, \( y = b - s \) if the individual is unemployed and search and \( y = b \) if the individual is unemployed without searching. An individual who searches, finds a job with an exogenous instantaneous probability \( h \) and a person with a job loses it with probability \( q \). Define the average discounted probabilities (ADP’s) of being unemployed (in state 2) as

\[
\Pi_2 \equiv r \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \mu_{2,t} dt
\]

It is straightforward to calculate that

\[
\Pi_2 \equiv \frac{q}{r + h + q}
\]

where \( \mu_{2,t} \) is the probabilities of being unemployed at time \( t \), respectively, conditional on being employed at time zero, provided that unemployed search for a job.

To see this, note that

\[
\mu_{2,t+dt} = q dt (1 - \mu_{2,t}) + (1 - h dt) \mu_{2,t}
\]

or

\[
\frac{\mu_{2,t+dt} - \mu_{2,t}}{dt} = q (1 - \mu_{2,t}) - h dt \mu_{2,t}
\]

or

\[
\frac{\mu_{2,t+dt} - \mu_{2,t}}{dt} = q - (h + q) \mu_{2,t}
\]
taking the limit as $dt \to 0$ yields

$$\dot{\mu}_{2,t} = -(h + q)\mu_{2,t} + q,$$

(10)

with root $-(h + q)$. The steady state is a particular solution, i.e.,

$$\bar{\mu}_2 = \frac{q}{h + q}.$$

The solution to the system is then

$$\mu_{2,t} = (\mu_{2,0} - \bar{\mu}_2)e^{-(h+q)t} + \bar{\mu}_2.$$

Solving for the $ex-ante$ case when individuals are born employed ($\mu_{2,0} = 0$) yields $\mu_{2,t} = \bar{\mu}_2 \left(1 - e^{-(h+q)t}\right)$.

Then,

$$\Pi_2 = r \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \bar{\mu}_2 \left(1 - e^{-(h+q)t}\right) dt$$

$$= r\bar{\mu}_2 \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left(1 - e^{-(h+q)t}\right) dt$$

$$= r\frac{q}{h + q} \left(\frac{1}{r} - \frac{1}{r + q + h}\right) = \frac{q}{r + h + q}$$

Actuarial fairness the UI system is now a simple linear function of the benefits

$$\tau = \Pi_2 b$$

(11)
Under constant absolute risk aversion and stationary income uncertainty, the value functions for the two states $j \in \{1, 2\}$ can be separated

$$V(A_t, j) = W(A_t) \tilde{V}_j(\tau, b),$$

where

$$W(A_t) \equiv \frac{e^{-\gamma A_t}}{r}$$

$$\tilde{V}_j \equiv -e^{-\gamma c_j},$$

and $\sigma_j$ are state-dependent consumption constants such that the state dependent consumption functions are

$$c_j(A_t) = rA_t + \sigma_j.$$  

The consumption constants $\sigma_j$ are nonlinear functions of income in all states and thus, depend on the planner choice variables $\tau$, and $b$. The constants are found as the unique solutions to the Bellman equations for each state:

$$\sigma_1 = w - \tau - \frac{q \left(e^{\gamma \Delta_2} - 1 \right)}{\gamma r},$$

$$\sigma_2 = b - s - \tau + \frac{h \left(1 - e^{-\gamma \Delta_2} \right)}{\gamma r},$$

where $q$ is the exogenous hiring rate, $h$ is the hiring rate if the agent search actively and

$$\Delta_2 \equiv \sigma_1 - \sigma_2.$$
Let us derive these results;

Conjecturing that the value functions are \(-\frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma(rA_t+\sigma)}\), we can write the Bellman equations for the employed as

\[
-\frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma(rA_t+\sigma_1)} = \max_{\sigma} -e^{-\gamma(rA_t+\sigma)} dt - (1 - rdt) (1 - qdt) \frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma(rA_{t+dt}+\sigma)} \\
- (1 - rdt) qdt \frac{1}{r} [e^{-\gamma(rA_{t+dt}+\sigma_2)}].
\]

Using the budget constraint, \(A_{t+dt} = A_t + r (w - \tau - \sigma) dt\), and dividing by \(e^{-\gamma rA_t}\), this becomes

\[
-\frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma \sigma_1} = \max_{\sigma} -e^{-\gamma \sigma} dt - (1 - rdt) (1 - qdt) \frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma(r(w-\tau-\sigma)dt+\sigma)} \\
- (1 - rdt) qdt \frac{1}{r} [e^{-\gamma(r(w-\tau-\sigma)dt+\sigma_2)}].
\]

Using the first-order linear approximation, \(e^{-\gamma(r(w-\tau-\sigma)dt+\sigma)} \approx e^{-\gamma \sigma_1} - \gamma r (w - \tau - \sigma) dt e^{-\gamma \sigma_1}\), adding \(\frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma \sigma_1}\) to both sides, dividing by \(dt\) and letting \(dt\) approach zero, yields

\[
0 = \max_{\sigma} \left\{-re^{-\gamma (\sigma-\sigma_1)} + r + \gamma r (w - \tau - \sigma)\right\} + q (1 - e^{-\gamma (\sigma_2-\sigma_1)}) \tag{16}
\]

Similarly, for the unemployed, we obtain

\[
0 = \max_{\sigma} \left\{-re^{-\gamma (\sigma-\sigma_2)} + \gamma r (b_2 - s - \tau - \sigma)\right\} + r + h - he^{-\gamma (\sigma_1-\sigma_2)} \tag{17}
\]

28
The right hand sides of (16) and (17) are maximized at \( \sigma = \sigma_j \), implying that these values maximize the RHS's of the Bellman equations.

Substituting \( \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma_2 \) respectively for \( \sigma \) in (16) and (17) solves the maxima. Finally, solving for gives the \( \sigma_j^* \) gives (15), which by construction then solves the Bellman equations.

Clearly, the objective of the planner is now to maximize \( \sigma_1 \), from which also follows time consistency – the welfare of employed at all times is maximized.

The first step is now to derive an expression for \( \sigma_1 \) in terms of \( \Delta_2 \) where the budget constraint (11) is used to replace the tax rate. For this purpose, we subtract the second line of (15) from the first and solve for \( b \). Then, we use this expression in the budget constraint \( \tau = \Pi_2 b \) and substitute for \( \tau \) in the first line of (15). This yields

\[
\sigma_1 = \kappa + \Pi_2 \left( \Delta_2 - \frac{he^{-\gamma \Delta_2}}{\gamma r} \right) - (1 - \Pi_2) q \frac{e^{\gamma \Delta_2}}{\gamma r},
\]

where \( \kappa \) is a constant, independent of the choice variables. Straightforward calculus shows that (18) defines \( \sigma_1 \) as a concave function of \( \Delta_2 \) with a unique maximum at 0. The reason for \( \sigma_1 \) being maximized at \( \Delta_2 = 0 \) is obvious – when actuarial insurance is available, full insurance maximizes utility. However, \( \Delta_2 = 0 \) is not incentive compatible. Searching moving will not occur voluntarily. Now, as in Baily approach, we can use the consumption fall upon separation, \( \Delta_2 \), to evaluate the gain by finding employment.

If the unemployed agent shirks she is unemployed for ever, getting an income \( b - \tau \) and a utility

\[
\frac{1}{r}e^{-\gamma r A_1}e^{-\gamma(b - \tau)}.
\]
The utility if the individual instead searches is

\[ \frac{1}{r} e^{-\gamma r A_t} e^{-\gamma \sigma_2}. \]

To induce search, we clearly need

\[ \sigma_2 \geq b - \tau. \]

Note that the consumption of the unemployed who search is \( r A_t + \sigma_2 \). Furthermore, her total income net of search costs is \( r A_t + b - \tau - s \). Therefore, the search condition implies consumption to be strictly higher than income. Over time, the unemployed depletes her assets and consumption therefore falls, despite the benefits being constant. The celebrated result by Shawell-Weiss and Hopenhayn-Nicolini that consumption should optimally fall over the unemployment spell when the insurer can fully control consumption (no hidden savings) is therefore mimicked in this case, where hidden savings are allowed.

The final part is now to express the search constraint in terms of the consumption difference \( \Delta_2 \). Using the second line of (15), the search constraint can be written

\[ \Delta_2 \geq -\frac{\ln \left(1 - \gamma r \frac{s}{h}\right)}{\gamma}, \]

which we label the \textit{IC2-condition}. We depict this in Figure 1,

A higher \( r \) and \( s \) and lower \( h \) reduce the value of searching, and shifts the constraint to the right.
Figure 1

\[ \sigma_1 \]

\[ \Delta_2 \]

\[ \frac{-\ln(1 - \frac{\gamma s}{h})}{\gamma} \]

IC2
Finally, we can solve for the value of $b$ that makes the IC2 condition bind exactly. Take the difference between the equations in (15) set it to $-\frac{\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)}{\gamma}$ and solve for $b$, which gives

$$-\frac{\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)}{\gamma} = w - \tau - \frac{q \left( e^{-\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)} - 1 \right)}{\gamma r} - \left( b - s - \tau + \frac{h \left( 1 - e^{\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)} \right)}{\gamma r} \right)$$

$$b = w + s + \frac{\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)}{\gamma} - \frac{q \left( -\frac{h}{-h+\gamma r s} - 1 \right)}{\gamma r} - \frac{h \left( 1 - -\frac{h+\gamma r s}{h} \right)}{\gamma r}$$

$$= w + \frac{\ln(1-\gamma r^s_h)}{\gamma} - \frac{sq}{h - \gamma r s}$$

In Hassler & Rodriguez (2008), we extend this model and show that it is useful to analyze multiple incentive constraints. It is immediate to show that benefits should optimally be constant over time. This since the incentive constraint does not change over time. We also introduce multiple incentive constraints, showing that if there is also a need to induce some individuals to move to find a job, this is optimally done with an initial period of low benefits.
2 Optimal taxation – the Ramsey approach

2.1 Optimal taxation under commitment – the Ramsey problem

To provide some intuition already before providing the famous Chamley & Judd result consider the following simple model.

Preferences

The representative agent has an additively separable utility function in consumption and leisure,

\[ U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, 1 - n_t). \]  

satisfying the usual Inada conditions so first-order conditions are sufficient.

Technology

Output is produced by labor only on a competitive labor market. One unit of labor produces \( w \) units of the consumption good. Individuals have one unit of labor each period to split between work and leisure \( l = 1 - n \). There is a perfect market for government bonds.

Budget constraints

The government needs to finance an exogenous stream of consumption by tax revenues. For simplicity, we have already assumed that its consumption does not interfere with the individuals private problem. We will assumed that the government cannot finance its consumption by lump sum taxation. We do this without providing an explicit reason within the model. Instead, the government has at its disposal, a linear labor income tax \( \tau_{n,t} \), a consumption tax \( \tau_{c,t} \) and a capital income tax, \( \tau_k \). Wages are exogenous at rate \( w_t \).
The representative individual’s budget constraint period $t$ is

$$c_t (1 + \tau_{c,t}) + b_{t+1} = (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t n_t + (1 - \tau_{k,t}) (1 + r_t) b_t$$

where $b$ is government bonds.

Substituting forward yields,

$$
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} c_t \prod_{s=0}^{t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s} + \lim_{t \to \infty} c_t \prod_{s=0}^{t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s} b_t

= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} w_t n_t W_{n,t} \prod_{s=0}^{t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s} + \frac{1 - \tau_{k,0}}{(1 + \tau_{c,0})} (1 + r_0) b_0
$$

where

$$W_{i,t} \equiv \frac{1 + \tau_{c,t}}{(1 + \tau_{c,t-1})(1 - \tau_{k,t})}$$

$$W_{i,0} = 1$$

and

$$W_{n,t} \equiv \frac{1 - \tau_{n,t}}{1 + \tau_{c,t}}.$$

We call $W_{i,t}$ the intertemporal wedge between $t - 1$ and $t$ and $W_{n,t}$ the intratemporal wedge. In addition, there is an aggregate resource constraint,

$$g_t + c_t = w_t n_t. \quad (22)$$

We now make the following definitions:
Definition 1 A feasible allocation is a sequence \( \{c_t, n_t, g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) that satisfies the aggregate budget constraint (25).

Definition 2 A price system is a sequence of interest rates \( \{r_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \) that is bounded and such that \( 1 + r_t \geq 0 \forall t \).

Definition 3 A government policy is a sequence \( \{\tau_{c,t}, \tau_{k,t}, \tau_{n,t}, b_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \).

Definition 4 A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a price system and a government policy such that

1. Given the price system and the government policy, the allocation solves the maximization problem of the individual.

2. The aggregate resource constraint is satisfied.

The problem of the consumer is to maximize (20) subject to (21).

First order conditions are

\[
\beta^t u_c (c_t, 1 - n_t) = \lambda \prod_{s=0}^{t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s}
\]

\[
\beta^t u_l (c_t, 1 - n_t) = \lambda w_l W_{n,t} \prod_{s=0}^{t} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \right) \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s}
\]
which we can write
\[
\frac{u_{c_t}(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) w_t} = W_{n,t}
\]
\[
\frac{u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{u_c(c_0, 1 - n_0) \beta^t \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r_t)} = \prod_{s=0}^{t} W_{i,s}
\]

**Result** A sequence of consumption and labor supply satisfying (23), the budget constraint (21) and the resource constraint (22) is a competitive equilibrium.

Note: the government’s budget constraint is redundant.

The Ramsey Problem

Maximizing (20) over the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium is called the *Ramsey problem*.

**Result**

As we see, in the equations determining the competitive equilibrium, only the wedges and \( \tau_{k,0} \) and \( \tau_{c,0} \) appear. The latter two affect the value of the initial government debt. Therefore, the government has an over-supply of instruments in the sense that many sequences of taxes \{\( \tau_{c,t}, \tau_{k,t}, \tau_{n,t} \)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} can imply the same allocation.

**Result** Over any \( t + 1 \) periods starting from period 0, there are \( 3(t + 1) \) independent tax rates but the budget constraint of individual is determined by \( 2t + 3 \) instruments given by \( t \) intertemporal wedges \( (W_{i,1},...W_{i,t}) \), \( t + 1 \) intratemporal wedges \( (W_{l,0},...W_{n,t}) \) and two initial tax-rates \( \tau_{s,0} \) and \( \tau_{c,0} \).

**Result** Any sequence of taxes can be replicated using only labor and consumption taxes plus an initial capital income tax.
Proof: Using labor and consumption taxes gives \(2(t + 1)\) independent instruments that together with an initial capital income tax can construct any sequence of wedges.

**Result** Consider a sequence of taxes such that consumption taxes are constant and capital income tax rates are constant at \(\tau_k\). Given an initial consumption tax \(\tau_{c,0}\), an identical intertemporal wedge can be constructed with zero capital income taxes and a sequence of consumption taxes satisfying

\[
\frac{1 + \tau_{c,1}}{1 + \tau_{c,0}} = \frac{1}{1 - \tau_k},
\]

\[
\frac{1 + \tau_{c,t}}{1 + \tau_{c,t-1}} = \frac{1}{1 - \tau_k},
\]

implying

\[
1 + \tau_{c,t} = \frac{1 + \tau_{c,0}}{(1 - \tau_k)^t}
\]

Note that if \(\tau_k > 0\), this sequence is increasing geometrically without bounds. It is perhaps intuitive that a sequence of consumption taxes that increases geometrically without bounds is suboptimal. Similarly, \(\tau_k < 0\), the consumption tax approaches -100%. That neither of this is optimal is really the Chamley-Judd result.

Before proceeding, we note that using the (23) in the private budget constraint, we get

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (c_t u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) - n_t u_l(c_t, 1 - n_t)) = u_c(c_0, 1 - n_0) \left( \frac{1 - \tau_{k,0}}{1 + \tau_{c,0}} \right) (1 + r_0) b_0
\]

An allocation that satisfies (24) the private budget constraint and is privately optimal for some sequences of taxes. If it also satisfies the aggregate budget constraint it is also
implementable as a competitive equilibrium. Note, that there is no taxes or prices here except the two initial taxes on pre-existing capital.

Nevertheless we can reformulate the Ramsey problem as max

$$\max U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, 1 - n_t)$$

s.t. $$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (c_t u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) - n_t u_l(c_t, 1 - n_t)) = u_c(c_0, 1 - n_0) \left( \frac{1 - \tau_{k,0}}{1 + \tau_{c,0}} \right) (1 + r_0) b_0$$

$$g_t + c_t = w_t n_t$$

Sometimes, it is easier to work with this direct or primal approach. Here, it is then straightforward to construct the wedges and then taxes that implement the Ramsey optimal allocation.

### 2.2 The Chamley-Judd result

Now, we only add a production technology using capital. There is an infinitely lived representative agent with preferences

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, l_t).$$

The household has one unit of labor per period, to be split between leisure $l$ and work $n$. The aggregate budget constraint is

$$c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} = F(k_t, n_t) + (1 - \delta) k_t$$

(25)

The production function is constant returns to scale and factor markets are competitive.
Profit maximization of the representative firm implies

\[ w_t = F_n (k_t, n_t) \]

\[ r_t = F_k (k_t, n_t) \]

The government needs to finance an exogenous stream of expenditures \( \{g_t\}_t^{\infty} \) using taxes on labor and capital and can smooth taxes by using a bond. Following the literature, we let the interest rate on bonds be tax-free. Thus,

\[
g_t + b_t = \tau_{k,t} r_t k_t + \tau_{n,t} w_t n_t + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} \\
= F (k_t, n_t) - (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_t k_t - (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t n_t + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t}
\]

where \( b_t \) is government borrowing and \( R_t \) is the interest rate on government bonds.

Households have budget constraints

\[
c_t + k_{t+1} + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} = (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t n_t + (1 - \tau_{k,t}) k_t r_t + (1 - \delta) k_t + b_t
\]

First order conditions are:

\[
c_t; u_c (c_t, l_t) = \lambda_t
\]

\[
l_t; u_l (c_t, l_t) = \lambda_t (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t
\]

\[
k_{t+1}; \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} \left( (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1} + (1 - \delta) \right)
\]

\[
b_{t+1}; \lambda_t \frac{1}{R_t} = \beta \lambda_{t+1}
\]
Clearly, the first three implies

\[
\frac{u_t(c_t, l_t)}{u_c(c_t, l_t)} = (1 - \tau_{n,t}) u_t
\]

\[
u_c(c_t, l_t) = \beta u_c(c_{t+1}, l_{t+1}) \left((1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1} + (1 - \delta)\right)
\]

and the last two the no arbitrage condition

\[
R_t = (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1} + (1 - \delta)
\]

Transversality conditions are

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \left( \prod_{i=0}^{T-1} R_{i}^{-1} \right) k_{T+1} = 0
\]

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \left( \prod_{i=0}^{T-1} R_{i}^{-1} \right) \frac{b_{T+1}}{R_{T}} = 0
\]

We can now make the following definitions:

**Definition 5** A feasible allocation is a sequence \(\{k_t, c_t, l_t, g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) that satisfies the aggregate budget constraint (25).

**Definition 6** A price system is a sequence of prices \(\{w_t, r_t, R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) that is bounded and non-negative.

**Definition 7** A government policy is a sequence \(\{\tau_n,t, \tau_k,t, b_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) and perhaps \(\{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) if that can be chosen.
Definition 8 A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a price system and a government policy such that

1. Given the price system and the government policy, the allocation solves the maximization problem of the individual and of the firm.

2. The government budget constraints are satisfied.

Definition 9 The Ramsey problem is to choose a competitive equilibrium (i.e., pick a particular government policy) that maximizes the welfare of the representative individual.

The Lagrangean of the Ramsey problem can be written

\[
L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{ u(c_t, 1 - n_t) + \psi_t (F(k_t, n_t) - (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_t k_t - (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t n_t - b_t - g_t + b_{t+1}/R_t) \\
+ \theta_t (F(k_t, n_t) + (1 - \delta) k_t - c_t - g_t - k_{t+1}) \\
+ \mu_{1,t} (u_l(c_t, l_t) - u_c(c_t, l_t) (1 - \tau_{n,t}) w_t) \\
+ \mu_{2,t} (u_c(c_t, l_t) - \beta u_c(c_{t+1}, l_{t+1}) (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1} + (1 - \delta))\}
\]

Now, the first order condition for \(k_{t+1}\) is

\[
\theta_t = \beta \psi_{t+1} (F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1}) - \beta \theta_{t+1} (F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta))
\]
and for $c_t$

$$u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) = \theta_t$$

giving

$$u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) = \beta \psi_{t+1} (F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - (1 - \tau_{k,t}) r_{t+1}) + \beta u_c(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1}) (F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)).$$

Suppose there is a steady state of the model, then

$$u_c = \beta (\psi (F_k - (1 - \tau_k) F_k) + u_c (F_k + (1 - \delta)))$$

$$= \beta (\psi \tau_k F_k + u_c (F_k + (1 - \delta))).$$

Private optimality (the Euler equation), implies in steady state

$$u_c = \beta u_c ((1 - \tau_k) F_k + (1 - \delta))$$

$$1 = \beta (F_k + (1 - \delta) - \tau_k F_k)$$

$$\frac{1}{\beta} + \tau_k F_k = F_k + (1 - \delta)$$
giving

\[ u_c = \beta \left( \psi \tau_k F_k + u_c \left( \frac{1}{\beta} + \tau_k F_k \right) \right) \]

\[ = \beta \left( (\psi + u_c) \tau_k F_k \right) + u_c \]

\[ 0 = \beta (\psi + u_c) \tau_k F_k \]

requiring \( \tau_k = 0 \).

### 2.3 Discussion

We have shown that also in this simple economy, tax smoothing implies that the intertemporal margin should not be distorted. We have also found an equivalence between constant consumption taxes and an investment tax. In an infinite horizon model, a positive investment tax in steady state has implications identical to ever increasing consumption taxes. This can thus provide some intuition for Chamley & Judd’s result that investment taxes should not be used in the long run. The result is quite robust. For example it extends to the case of heterogeneity, if the government wants to use it’s revenues to support some capital poor individuals, it should not tax capital accumulation in steady state. Here intuition could be that the capital stock in steady state is elastic enough to imply the tax incidence of capital taxes is on workers.

The result also extends to the stochastic case, in which case expected taxes should be zero and not distort savings.

An interesting case is if government spendings are stochastic. With complete markets,
the government should then commit to a tax system that insures them against this (Chari et al. 1994). If spending needs are large, taxes on capital should be high and vice versa.

The zero capital income tax result does not go through in some cases:

1. If there are untaxed factors of production that generate profits and these factors are strict complements to capital. Then capital should be taxed (negatively if they are substitutes).

2. If market incompleteness makes people save too much for precautionary reasons.

In the short run, capital income taxes also collect revenue from sunk investments. Then, the tax is partly lump sum, which provides an argument for such taxes early in the planning horizon. But when is that zero? Has it already occurred a long time ago? In any case, we see a time consistency problem here.

Not also that the long-run maybe quite far out and people alive today might loose by a policy that maximizes the welfare of a constructed infinitely lived.

2.4 Time consistent taxation

2.4.1 A numerical approach

Here we follow Klein and Rios-Rull 2003. Consider a stochastic economy productivity is $z(s^t)$ and government consumption is $g(s^t)$ where $s^t$ is the history of a shock that in every period belongs to a finite element set $S$. The shock follows a Markov chain with transition
matrix $\Gamma$. The representative individual has utility given by

$$E \sum_{t}^{\infty} \beta^{t} u(c_{t}, h_{t})$$

and the aggregate resource constraint is

$$F(K(s^{t-1}), H(s^{t}), z(s^{t})) + (1 - \delta) K(s^{t-1}) = C(s^{t}) + K(s^{t}) + g(s^{t})$$

Individual budget constraints are

$$c_{t} + k_{t+1} = (1 - \tau_{t}) w_{t} h_{t} + (1 + r_{t} (1 - \theta_{t})) k_{t}$$

where lower case variables denote individual and a balanced budget constraint is imposed on the government

$$\theta_{t} k_{t} r_{t} + \tau_{t} w_{t} h_{t} = g_{t}$$

If the government could set $\theta_{t}$ at $t$, this would be an *ex-post* lump-sum tax. Klein and Rios-Rull assume a limited commitment, i.e., that taxes are set for the next period. To find a time consistent solution, we require that the policy the government follows is of Markov type, i.e., it is a function of the set of state variables only. These are

$$\{g, z, K, \theta\} \equiv x$$
Using budget balance, a policy rule is then

$$\theta_{t+1} = \psi(x_t)$$

We then define a recursive competitive equilibrium in the standard way, noting that the value function $v$ depends on the policy rule

$$v(x, k; \psi) .$$

Assuming the government is benevolent, it assesses welfare according to

$$V(x; \psi) = v(x, k; \psi) .$$

We can also define the competitive equilibrium and its value function in case the government decides next periods tax to $\theta'$ and following government follow $\psi(x)$. The value function is then

$$\hat{v}(x, \theta', k; \psi) .$$

The associated welfare of the government is

$$\hat{V}(x, \theta', \psi)$$
Now define the current maximizing policy as

\[ \Psi (x; \psi) = \arg \max_{\varphi'} \hat{V} (x, \theta'; \psi) \]

A Markov perfect optimal tax policy then satisfies the fixed-point requirement

\[ \Psi (x; \psi (x)) = \psi (x) , \]

i.e., if the government expects coming government to use \( \psi \) it is optimal for itself to use \( \psi \).

Klein and Rios-Rull use log utility and assume government consumption and productivity can each take on two different values respectively. They calibrate the model to US, data. Average \( g \) is 20%, varying 1.6% points up or down and an autocorrelation of .66. Productivity has a standard deviation of 2.4% with autocorrelation .88.

Comparing the commitment and no commitment they find that in commitment expected capital income tax rates are (almost) zero but with a standard deviation of 18%. having a strong positive correlation with \( g \) and a strong negative with \( z \). Labor income taxes are 31% and almost fixed.

With 1 years commitment only, the average capital income tax rate is 65% with a standard deviation of 11%. It is positively correlated with \( g \), but less than with full commitment. Labor income tax rates are 12% on average with a standard deviation of 3%. Output is 14% lower than under commitment and somewhat less volatile.

Also 4 years commitment produce high average tax rates on capital income 36%.
2.4.2 A time-consistent taxation problem with an analytical solution

The model economy is populated by a continuum one of dynasties of two-period lived agents. In the first period of their lives, agents undertake an investment in human capital. The cost of investment to each individual is $e^2$, and the return is spread over two periods. In particular, the individual earn labor earning equal to $e \cdot w$ in the first period of her life, and $e \cdot w \cdot z$ in the second period. $z \leq 1$ captures the fact that agents retire within the second period of their life.

Dynasties derive utility from the consumption of a private and a public good. The public good is financed with a linear age-independent tax on income, denoted $\tau_t$.

Each period’s felicity depends on the total consumption (net of the investment cost) of the dynasty’s member, irrespective of the split of consumption between the old and the young agent. The preferences of the dynasty which is alive at $t$ are described by the following linear-quadratic utility functions

\[ U_t = c_t + Ag_t - c_t^2 + \beta U_{t+1}, \]

where $\beta \in [0, 1)$ is the discount factor, $g_t$ denotes the public good available at $t$ and $A$ is a parameter describing the marginal utility of the public good. The marginal cost of the public good is unity and we focus on the case where $A \geq 1$, that will imply that the public good is socially valuable. Furthermore, we assume that the discount rate, $(1 - \beta) / \beta$, equals the market interest rate. Given our assumptions, the savings decisions can be abstracted from, and the welfare of a dynasty is simply given by the present discounted value of their
income net of investment costs;

\[ U_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left((1 - \tau_{t+j}) y_{t+j} + Ag_{t+j} - e_{t+j}^2 \right), \]

where:

\[ y_{t+j} = (ze_{t+j-1} + e_{t+j}) w, \tag{26} \]

i.e., the gross income accruing to the dynasty at \( t + j \), given by the sum of the labor incomes generated by the parent born at \( t + j - 1 \) and her offspring born at \( t + j \). The parent’s human capital depends on her investment at \( t + j - 1 \) \( (e_{t+j-1}) \) while the offspring’s human capital depends on her investment at \( t + j \) \( (e_{t+j}) \). Since agents live for two periods, and the effect of the human capital investment dies with them, \( y_t \) only depends on the realization of two subsequent investments.

Due to a standard free-riding problem, there is not private provision of the public good. This is instead provided by an agency that will be called "government" that has access to a technology to turn one unit of revenue into one unit of public good. The government revenue is collected by taxing agents’ labor income at the flat rate \( \tau \), subject to a balanced budget constraint. More formally, the government budget constraint requires that \( g_t \leq \tau_t (ze_{t-1} + e_t) w \), where, at time \( t \), \( e_{t-1} \) is predetermined. \( e_t \), instead is determined after \( \tau_t \) is set and in addition depends on expectations about the future tax rate. In particular, the optimal investment of a young agent at \( t \) is given by

\[ e_t^* = e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) \equiv \max \left[ 0, \frac{1 + \beta z - (\tau_t + \beta z \tau_{t+1})}{2} \right]. \tag{27} \]
This equation shows the distortionary effect of taxation on investment. Note that taxation at \( t + j \) distorts the investment of two generations: that born at \( t + j - 1 \), as \( e_{t+j-1}^* = e(\tau_{t+j-1}, \tau_{t+j}) \), and that born at \( t + j \), as \( e_{t+j}^* = e(\tau_{t+j}, \tau_{t+j+1}) \).

Letting \( e_t = e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) \) and substituting it in into the government budget constraint, allows us to express the provision of public good at \( t \) as a function of current and future (one period ahead) taxes plus the level of investments sunk at \( t - 1 \). More formally:

\[
g_t = \tau_t (ze_{t-1} + e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})) w = g(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1}, e_{t-1}). \tag{28}
\]

Finally, we restrict \( \tau_t \in [0,1] \forall t \), which implies that investments, public good provision and private net income \((e^*_t, g_t \text{ and } (1 - \tau_t) y_t)\) all are non-negative.

Before discussing the Markov equilibrium, let us state the solution to the full commitment equilibrium\(^5\)

**Proposition 10** The optimal solution to the planner program is

\[
\tau_{t+1} = \max \left\{0, \tau^* - z (\tau_t - \tau^*) \right\} < 1, \tag{29}
\]

for \( t \geq 0 \) and

\[
\tau_0 = \begin{cases} 
\tau_0 = \left(1 + \frac{2ze_{-1}}{w(1-\beta z)}\right) \tau^* & \text{if } e_{-1} \leq \frac{w(1-\beta z)}{2z^2}, \\
\min \left\{1, (1 + \beta z + \frac{2ze_{-1}}{w}) \tau^*\right\} & \text{else.}
\end{cases}
\]

where

\[ \tau^* = \frac{A - 1}{2A - 1} \in [0, \frac{1}{2}) \]

is the steady-state tax rate. If \( z < 1 \), the Ramsey tax sequence converges asymptotically in an oscillatory fashion to \( \tau^* \). If \( z = 1 \), the Ramsey tax sequence is a 2-period cycle such that,

\[
\tau_t = \begin{cases} 
\tau_0 & \text{if } t \text{ is even} \\
\max \{0, 2\tau^* - \tau_0\} & \text{if } t \text{ is odd.}
\end{cases}
\]

Note that if \( e_{-1} = 0 \), the optimal tax is at the steady state immediately. With positive \( e_{-1} \), the planner wants to tax the pre-installed tax-base but this implies that also period 0 investments are hurt. To partly offset this, the planner promises taxes lower than steady state for period 1. But, there is then incentive to tax investments \( e_1 \) in period 1 a little higher by setting \( \tau_2 \) above the steady state tax. Oscillating taxes therefore tends to smooth distortions over time.

**The Markov allocation (Ramsey allocation without commitment)** Let us now characterize the optimal time consistent allocation, namely, the allocation that is chosen by a benevolent planner without access to a commitment technology. Clearly, the oscillating path described above is not time-consistent.

We will use the recursive formulation of the problem, now assuming that period \( t \) taxes are set in the beginning of period \( t \), and observed before period \( t \) investments are decided.
The period $t$ felicity of the planner is given by

$$F(e_{t-1}, \tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) = (1 - \tau_t) y_t - e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})^2 + Ag_t$$

$$= (\varepsilon e_{t-1} + e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1}))(1 + (A - 1) \tau_t) w - e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})^2,$$

where $e_{t-1}$ is pre-determined.

Without committment, the game between the government and the public is not degenerate. We characterize the equilibrium where $e_{t-1}$ is the only state variable in period $t$ and reputation is not used as a means to compensate for committment. Thus, taxes are set according to a time-invariant function $\tau_t = T(e_{t-1})$. Given this function, individuals rationally believe that $\tau_{t+1} = T(e_t)$ and individually rational investment choices must therefore satisfy

$$e_t = \frac{1 + \beta z - (\tau_t + \beta z T(e_t))}{2} w.$$

We can now define the equilibrium;

**Definition 11** A time-consistent (Markov) allocation without commitment is defined as a pair of functions $(T, I)$, where $T : [0, \infty) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a public policy rule, $\tau_t = T(e_{t-1})$, and $I : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ is a private investment rule, $e_t = I(\tau_t)$ such that the following functional equations are satisfied,

1. $T(e_{t-1}) = \arg \max_{\tau_t} \{ F(e_{t-1}, \tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) + \beta W(e_t) \}$ subject to $e_t = I(\tau_t), \tau_{t+1} = T(I(\tau_t))$,

2. $I(\tau_t) = (1 + \beta - (\tau_t + \beta T(I(\tau_t)))) w/2$,

3. $W(e_{t-1}) = \max_{\tau_t} \{ F(e_{t-1}, \tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) + \beta W(e_t) \}$ subject to $e_t = I(\tau_t), \tau_{t+1} = T(I(\tau_t))$. 

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The following Proposition can then be established.

**Proposition 12** Assume that either\(^6\) \( A \leq \frac{z^{(z+1)}}{(1+\beta) z^2 - 1} \) or \((1 + \beta) z^2 \leq 1\). Then, the time-consistent allocation is characterized as follows:

\[
T(e_{t-1}) = \min \{ \bar{\tau} + \alpha_1 (e_{t-1} - \bar{e}), 1 \}
\]

\[
I(\tau_t) = \bar{e} - \frac{w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} (\tau_t - \bar{\tau}),
\]

where

\[
\bar{e} = \frac{w (1 + \beta z) (1 - \alpha_0)}{2 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)} \leq e^*
\]

\[
\bar{\tau} = \frac{2 \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)}{2 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)} \geq \tau^*
\]

with equalities iff \( A = 1 \), and

\[
\alpha_1 = \frac{\sqrt{1 + 4A (A - 1) (1 - \beta z^2) - (1 + 2 (1 - \beta z^2) (A - 1))}}{\beta z (A - 1) (1 - \beta z^2) w} \geq 0
\]

\[
\alpha_0 = \frac{2 (A - 1) - \beta z \alpha_1 w}{2 + (A - 1) (4 + \beta z \alpha_1 w)} \geq 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \alpha_1}{\partial A} \geq 0, \frac{\partial \alpha_0}{\partial A} \geq 0, \frac{\partial \bar{\tau}}{\partial A} \geq 0, \frac{\partial \bar{e}}{\partial A} \leq 0.
\]

\(^6\)This assumption ensures that the constraint \( \tau_{t+1} \leq 1 \) never binds for \( t \geq 0 \). Without this constraint, the analysis would be substantially more complicated, involving non-continuous policy functions.
For all $t$, the equilibrium law of motion is

$$e_{t+1} = \bar{e} - z_d (e_t - \bar{e}), \quad (30)$$

$$\tau_{t+1} = \bar{\tau} - z_d (\tau_t - \bar{\tau}). \quad (31)$$

where

$$z_d \equiv \frac{\alpha_1 w}{2 + \beta \alpha_1 w} \in (0, z).$$

Given any $e_{-1}$, the economy converges to a unique steady state such that $\tau = \bar{\tau}$ and $e = \bar{e}$ following an oscillating path and the constraint $\tau_t \leq 1$ iff $t=0$ and $e_{-1} > \frac{1 - \alpha_0}{\alpha_1}$, while $\tau_t \geq 0$ never binds.

The parameter restriction under which the Proposition is stated is a sufficient condition for the constraint $\tau_{t+1} \leq 1$ never to bind for $t \geq 0$. When this constraint is violated, the equilibrium policy functions may be discontinuous, making the analysis substantially more involved.

The main findings are that

1. the Markov allocation implies higher steady-state taxation ($\bar{\tau} > \tau^*$) and lower output and investment ($\bar{e} < e^*$) than the Ramsey allocation.

2. the Markov allocation implies less oscillations (i.e., a smoother tax sequence) than the Ramsey allocation: $z_d < z$.

It is interesting to note that the steady-state tax rate, $\bar{\tau}$, can exceed $1/2$, i.e., it can
be larger than the constant value of taxes that maximizes tax revenues. Specifically, this happens if \( A > 1 + \frac{2 + z (1 - \beta z)}{z (2 + z (1 + \beta))} \), as threshold that decreases in \( \beta \) and \( z \). I may seem counter intuitive that a benevolent planner would choose a tax rate that in steady state is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. The fact that it can happen is due to lack of commitment; if \( \tau > 1/2 \), the planner would clearly want to reduce the steady state tax rate. However, the planner can only control current tax rate and reducing that leads to higher taxes the next period and the overall effect of this is to reduce current welfare.

2.5

Here follows a sketch of the proof. The idea of the proof is as follows; Guess that the optimal policy function is linear in the state variable

\[
\tau_{t+1} = T(e_t) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 e_t, \tag{32}
\]

for the undetermined coefficients \( \alpha_0 \) and \( \alpha_1 \). Use the guess to derive the investment rule. Substitute these to into the Bellman equation for period \( t \). Derive the first-order condition for period \( t \) and verify that it is linear in \( e_{t-1} \). Find \( \alpha_0 \) and \( \alpha_1 \) such that the FOC in period \( t \) is satisfied.

The planner felicity in period \( t \) is

\[
F(e_{t-1}, \tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) = (ze_{t-1} + e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1}))(1 + (A - 1) \tau_t) w - e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})^2,
\]

Given the guess, the investment decision is

\[
e_t = (1 + \beta z - (\tau_t + \beta z (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 e_t))) w / 2,
\]
implying
\[ e_t = I (\tau_t) = \frac{(1 + \beta z (1 - \alpha_0)) w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} - \frac{w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \tau_t \]

and
\[ \tau_{t+1} = T( I (\tau_t)) = \tilde{\tau} + z_d (\tau_t - \tilde{\tau}), \]
\[ e_{t+1} = I (T (I (e_t))) = \tilde{e} + z_d (e_t - \tilde{e}), \]

where
\[ \tilde{\tau} = \frac{2\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)}{2 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)}, \]
\[ \tilde{e} = \frac{w (1 + \beta z) (1 - \alpha_0)}{2 + \alpha_1 w (1 + \beta z)}, \]
\[ z_d = -\frac{w \alpha_1}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \]

The problem then admits the following recursive formulation:
\[ W(e_{t-1}) = \max_{\tau_t} \left\{ F(e_{t-1}, \tau_t, \tau_{t+1}) + \beta W(e_t) \right\}, \]
\[ \text{s.t.} \ \tau_{t+1} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 e_t, \]
\[ e_t = \frac{(1 + \beta z (1 - \alpha_0)) w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} - \frac{w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \tau_t. \]

Given the guess, the first-order condition for maximizing the RHS of the Bellman equation is
\[ \frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_t} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_{t+1}} \frac{d\tau_{t+1}}{d\tau_t} + \beta \frac{dW(e_t)}{de_t} \frac{de_t}{d\tau_t} = 0, \]
where

\[
\frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_t} = (z e_{t-1} + e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})) (A - 1) w - ((1 + (A - 1) \tau_t) w - 2 e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})) \frac{w}{2},
\]

\[
\frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_{t+1}} = -\beta z ((1 + (A - 1) \tau_t) w - 2 e(\tau_t, \tau_{t+1})) \frac{w}{2}
\]

where we have used the fact that

\[
\frac{\partial e_t}{\partial \tau_t} = -\frac{w}{2}, \quad \frac{\partial e_t}{\partial \tau_{t+1}} = -\beta z \frac{w}{2},
\]

Using the envelope condition, we obtain

\[
W'(e_t) = \frac{\partial F(e_t, \tau_{t+1}, \tau_{t+2})}{\partial e_t} = (1 + (A - 1) \tau_{t+1}) wz.
\]

which can be expressed in terms of \( \tau_t \) using the constraints in (36). We can then can write the first-order condition as

\[
0 = \frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_t} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial \tau_{t+1}} \frac{d\tau_{t+1}}{d\tau_t} + \beta W'(e_t) \frac{de_t}{d\tau_t}
\]

\[
0 = \left( A - \frac{\beta z \alpha_1 w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \right) e_t - \frac{2 (A - 1) w}{(2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w)^2} \tau_t + z (A - 1) e_{t-1}
\]

\[- w \frac{(1 + \beta z) (2 + A \beta z \alpha_1 w) + 2 \beta z \alpha_0 (A - 1)}{(2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w)^2}
\]

Using the fact that, \( e_t = \frac{(1 + \beta z (1 - \alpha_0)) w}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \tau_t \) and the guess \( \tau_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 e_{t-1} \), dividing
by \( w \) and collecting terms, this yields

\[
0 = \left( z(A-1) - \left( \frac{2A}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} + (A-1) \right) \frac{w \alpha_1}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \right) e_{t-1} + \frac{w (1 + \beta z)}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} \left( \frac{2A(1 - \alpha_0)}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} - (1 + \alpha_0 (A-1)) \right)
\]

In order for this condition to be satisfied for all \( e_{t-1} \) we need,

\[
z (A-1) - \left( \frac{2A}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} + (A-1) \right) \frac{w \alpha_1}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} = 0 \tag{37}
\]

\[
\frac{2A (1 - \alpha_0)}{2 + \beta z \alpha_1 w} - (1 + \alpha_0 (A-1)) = 0 \tag{38}
\]

A solution for these equations (ignoring the roots that would generate instability) is:

\[
\alpha_1 = \frac{\sqrt{1 + 4A (A-1) (1 - \beta z^2)} - (1 + 2 (1 - \beta z^2) (A-1))}{\beta z (A-1) (1 - \beta z^2) w} \geq 0
\]

\[
\alpha_0 = \frac{2 (A-1) - \beta z \alpha_1 w}{2 + (A-1) (4 + \beta z \alpha_1 w)}
\]

\[
= \frac{2A (A-1) (1 - \beta z^2) - \left( \sqrt{1 + 4A (A-1) (1 - \beta z^2)} - 1 \right)}{(A-1) \left( 2A (1 - \beta z^2) + \left( \sqrt{1 + 4A (A-1) (1 - \beta z^2)} - 1 \right) \right)} \geq 0
\]

The non-negativity of \( \alpha_0 \) and \( \alpha_1 \) are established by standard algebra, since, in both the expressions, the numerator and denominators are both positive.
3 New Public Finance – the Mirrlees approach

Let us now consider the dynamic Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation. Here, individuals are assumed to be different. These differences can be either in their productivity or in their value of leisure. Such differences imply that there is differences between individuals in their trade-off between leisure and work. It is assumed that the government cannot directly observe this differences, only observe the individuals market choices. For example, governments observe income, but not the effort exerted to get this income.

Consider a simple two-period example.

Individual preferences are:

\[ E \left( u(c_1) + v(n_1) + \beta(u(c_2) + v(n_2)) \right) \]

where \( c_t \) is consumption and \( n_t \) is labor supply/work effort. \( u \) is increasing and concave and \( v \) decreasing and concave. Individuals differ in their ability, denoted \( \theta \). It is assumed that there is a finite number \( i \in \{1, 2, ..., N\} \) of ability levels and ability might change over time. We will interchangeably use type and ability to denote \( \theta \). Output is produced in competitive firms using a linear technology where each individual \( i \) produces

\[ y_t (i) = \theta (i) n_t (i) . \]

There is a continuum of individuals of a unitary total mass. In the first period, individuals are given abilities by nature according to a probability function \( \pi_1 (i) \). The ability can then change to the second period. Second period ability is denoted \( \theta (i, j) \) and the transition
probability is $\pi_2 (j|i)$.

There is a storage technology with return $R$. Finally, the government needs to finance some spendings $G_1$ and $G_2$. At first, we analyze the case of no aggregate uncertainty.

The aggregate resource constraint is

$$
\sum_i \left( y_1 (i) - c_1 (i) + \sum_j \frac{y_2 (i,j) - c_2 (i,j)}{R} \pi_2 (j|i) \right) \pi_1 (i) + K_1 = G_1 + \frac{G_2}{R} \tag{39}
$$

where $K_1$ is an aggregate initial endowment.

The problem is now to maximize the utilitarian welfare function subject to the resource constraints and the incentive constraints, i.e., that individuals themselves choose labor supply and savings. A way of finding the second best allocation is to let the planner provide consumption and work conditional on the ability an individual claims to have (and if relevant, the aggregate state). Here this is in the first period $c_1 (i), y_1 (i)$ and in the second, $c_2 (i,j), y_1 (i,j)$. Individuals then report their abilities to the planner. The strategy of an individual is his first period report and then a reporting plan as a function of the realized period 2 ability. Let’s call the report $i_r$ and $j_r (j)$, where the latter is the report as a function of the true ability. The incentive constraint is then that individuals voluntarily report their true ability. According to the revelation principle, this always yields the best incentive compatible allocation. The truth-telling constraint is then that

$$
u (c_1 (i)) + v \left( \frac{y_1 (i)}{\theta_1 (i)} \right) + \beta \sum_j \left( u (c_2 (i,j)) + v \left( \frac{y_2 (i,j)}{\theta_2 (i,j)} \right) \right) \pi_2 (j|i) \tag{40}
$$

$$\geq u (c_1 (i_r)) + v \left( \frac{y_1 (i_r)}{\theta_1 (i)} \right) + \beta \sum_j \left( u (c_2 (i_r,j_r (j))) + v \left( \frac{y_2 (i_r,j_r (j))}{\theta_2 (i,j)} \right) \right) \pi_2 (j|i)$$
for any possible reporting strategy \( i_r, j_r (j) \). Note that the \( \theta_s \) are the true ones in both sides of the inequality. Note also that truth-telling implies that

\[
 u (c_2 (i, j)) + v \left( \frac{y_2 (i, j)}{\theta_2 (i, j)} \right) \geq u (c_2 (i_r, j_r (j))) + v \left( \frac{y_2 (i_r, j_r (j))}{\theta_2 (i, j)} \right) \forall j, \tag{41}
\]

otherwise utility could be increased by reporting \( j_r \) if the second period ability is \( j \). The planning problem is to maximize

\[
 \sum_i \left( u (c_1 (i)) + v \left( \frac{y_1 \theta_1 (i)}{\theta_1 (i)} \right) + \beta \sum_j \left( u (c_2 (i, j)) + v \left( \frac{y_2 (i, j)}{\theta_2 (i, j)} \right) \right) \pi_2 \left( j \mid i \right) \right) \pi (i)
\]

subject to (39) and (40).

Letting stars * denote optimal allocations. We can now define three wedges (distortions) that the informational friction may cause. These are the consumption-leisure (intratemporal) wedges

\[
 \tau_{y_1} (i) \equiv 1 + \frac{u' \left( \frac{y_1 \theta_1 (i)}{\theta_1 (i)} \right)}{u' (c_1^* (i))},
\]

\[
 \tau_{y_2} (i, j) \equiv 1 + \frac{u' \left( \frac{y_2 \theta_2 (i, j)}{\theta_2 (i, j)} \right)}{u' (c_2^* (i, j))},
\]

and the intertemporal wedge

\[
 \tau_k (i) \equiv 1 - \frac{u' (c_1^* (i))}{\sum_j \beta Ru' (c_2 (i, j)) \pi_2 \left( j \mid i \right)}.
\]

Clearly, in absence of government interventions, these wedges would be zero by perfect
competition and the first-order conditions of private optimization.

### 3.1 The inverse Euler equation

We will now show that if individual productivities are not always constant over time, the intertemporal wedge will not be zero. The logic is as follows and similar to what we have done above. In an optimal allocation, the resource cost (expected present value of consumption) of providing the equilibrium utility to each type, must be minimized. Consider the following perturbation around the optimal allocation for a given first period ability type $i$. Increase utility by a marginal amount $\Delta$ for all possible second period types $\{i, j\}$ the agent could become. To compensate, decrease utility by $\beta\Delta$ in the first period.

First, note that expected utility is not changed.

Second, since utility is changed in parallel for all ability levels the individual could have in the second period, their relative ranking cannot change. In other words, if we add $\Delta$ to both sides of (41) it must still be satisfied.

Thus, the incentive constraint is unchanged. However, the resource constraint is not necessarily invariant to this perturbation. Let

$$\tilde{c}_1(i; \Delta) = u^{-1}(u(c_1^*(i)) - \beta\Delta),$$

$$\tilde{c}_2(i, j; \Delta) = u^{-1}(u(c_2^*(i, j)) + \Delta)$$
denote the perturbed consumption levels. The resource expected resource cost of these are

$$\tilde{c}_1 (i; \Delta) + \sum_j \frac{1}{R} \tilde{c}_2 (i, j; \Delta) \pi_2 (j|i)$$

$$= u^{-1} (u (c_1^*(i)) - \beta \Delta) + \sum_j \frac{1}{R} u^{-1} (u (c_2^*(i, j)) + \Delta) \pi_2 (j|i).$$

The first-order condition for minimizing the resource cost over $\Delta$ must be satisfied at $\Delta = 0$, for the * consumption levels to be optimal.

Thus,

$$0 =$$

$$= \frac{-\beta}{u'(c_1^*(i))} + \sum_j \frac{1}{R} \frac{1}{u'(c_2^*(i, j))} \pi_2 (j|i)$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{u'(c_1^*(i))} = E_1 \frac{1}{\beta Ru'(c_2^*(i,.))},$$

which we note is an example of the inverse Euler equation.

From Jensen’s inequality, we find that

$$u'(c_1^*(i)) < E_\beta Ru'(c_2^*(i,.))$$

$$\Rightarrow \tau_k (i) > 0,$$

if and only if there is some uncertainty in $c_2^*$. Note that this uncertainty would come from second period ability being random and the allocation implying that second period consumption depends on the realization of ability. If second period ability is non-random, i.e.,
\( \pi_2(j|i) = 1 \) for some \( j \), then \( \tau_k(i) = 0 \).

### 3.2 A simple logarithmic example: insurance against low ability.

Suppose in the first period, ability is unity and in the second \( \theta > 1 \) or \( \frac{1}{\theta} \) with equal probability. Disregard government consumption – set \( G_1 = G_2 = 0 \), although non-zero spending is quite easily handled. The problem is therefore to provide a good insurance against a low-ability shock when this is not observed.

The first best allocation is the solution to

\[
\max_{c_1, y_1, c_h, c_l, y_h, y_l} u(c_1) + v(y_1) + \beta \left( \frac{u(c_h) + v\left(\frac{y_h}{\theta}\right)}{2} + \frac{u(c_l) + v\left(\frac{y_l}{\theta}\right)}{2} \right)
\]

\[s.t. 0 = y_1 + \frac{y_h + y_l}{2R} - c_1 - \frac{c_h + c_l}{2R}\]

First order conditions are

\[u'(c_1) = \lambda, v'(y_1) = -\lambda\]

\[\beta u'(c_h) = \frac{\lambda}{R}, \beta u'(c_l) = \frac{\lambda}{R}\]

\[\beta v'\left(\frac{y_h}{\theta}\right) \frac{1}{\theta} = -\frac{\lambda}{R}, \beta v'(\theta y_l)\theta = -\frac{\lambda}{R}\]
3.2.1 A simple example

Suppose for example that \( u(c) = \ln(c) \) and \( v(n) = -\frac{n^2}{2} \) and \( \beta = R = 1 \). Then, we get

\[
\frac{1}{c_1} = \lambda, \frac{1}{c_h} = \lambda \\
\frac{1}{c_l} = \lambda, y_1 = \lambda \\
\frac{y_h}{\theta^2} = \lambda, y_l \theta^2 = \lambda
\]

\[
c_1 + \frac{c_h + c_l}{2} - y_1 - \frac{y_h + y_l}{2} = 0
\]

We see immediately that \( c_1 = c_h = c_l \) while \( y_h = \theta^2 y_1 \) and \( y_l = \frac{y_1}{\theta^2} \) and \( y_1 = \sqrt{\frac{2}{1 + \frac{1}{2}(\theta^2 + \theta^{-2})}} = n_1 \). Therefore, \( n_h = \frac{y_h}{\theta} = \theta n_1 \) and \( n_l = y_l \theta = \frac{n_1}{\theta} \). Thus, if the individual becomes of high ability in the second period, he should work more but don’t get any higher consumption. Is this incentive compatible?

We conjecture that the binding incentive constraint is for the high ability type. High has to be given sufficient consumption to make him voluntarily choose not to report being low ability. If he misreports, he gets \( c_l \) and is asked to produce \( y_l \). The constraint is therefore

\[
u(c_1) + v(y_1) + \beta \left( \frac{u(c_h) + v\left(\frac{y_h}{\theta}\right)}{2} + \frac{u(c_l) + v(\theta y_l)}{2} \right) \\
\geq u(c_1) + v(y_1) + \beta \left( \frac{u(c_l) + v\left(\frac{y_l}{\theta}\right)}{2} + \frac{u(c_l) + v(\theta y_l)}{2} \right)
\]
\[ u(c_h) + v\left(\frac{y_h}{\theta}\right) \geq u(c_l) + v\left(\frac{y_l}{\theta}\right) \]
\[ \ln c_h - \ln c_l \geq \frac{y_h^2 - y_l^2}{2\theta^2} \]

We conjecture this is binding. The problem is then

\[ \max_{c_1, y_1, c_h, c_l, y_h, y_l} \ln (c_1) - \frac{y_1^2}{2} + \left( \frac{\ln c_h - \left(\frac{y_h}{\theta}\right)^2}{2} + \frac{\ln c_l - \left(\frac{y_l}{\theta}\right)^2}{2} \right) \]
\[ s.t. \quad 0 = y_1 + \frac{y_h + y_l}{2} - c_1 - \frac{c_h + c_l}{2} \]
\[ 0 = \ln c_h - \ln c_l - \frac{y_h^2 - y_l^2}{2\theta^2} \]

Denoting the shadow values by \( \lambda_r \) and \( \lambda_l \) the FOCs for the consumption levels are

\[ c_1 = \frac{1}{\lambda_r} \]
\[ c_h = \frac{1 + 2\lambda_l}{\lambda_r} \]
\[ c_l = \frac{1 - 2\lambda_l}{\lambda_r} \]

from which we see

\[ \frac{c_h^*}{c_1^*} = 1 + 2\lambda_l, \quad \frac{c_l^*}{c_1^*} = 1 - 2\lambda_l \]

and

\[ \tau_k \equiv 1 - \frac{u'(c_1^*)}{\beta R\left(\frac{u'(c_h^*)}{2} + u'(c_l^*)}{2} = 1 - \frac{\lambda_r}{1 + 2\lambda_l} \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\lambda_r}{1 - 2\lambda_l} \frac{1}{2} = (2\lambda_l)^2 \]

implying a positive intertemporal wedge if the IC constraint binds.
The intratemporal wedges are found by analyzing the FOC’s for the labor supplies

\[ y_1^* = \lambda_r \]
\[ y_h^* = \frac{\lambda_r}{1 + 2\lambda_I} \theta^2 \]
\[ y_l^* = \frac{\lambda_r}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I} \theta^2 \]

\[ \tau_{y_1} = 1 + \frac{v'(y_1^*)}{u'(c_1^*)} = 1 - \frac{y_1^*}{\frac{1}{\theta}} = 1 - \frac{\lambda_r}{\frac{1}{\theta}} = 0, \]

\[ \tau_{y_2}(h) = 1 + \frac{v'(y_h^*)}{\theta u'(c_h^*)} = 1 + \frac{-y_h^*}{\theta \frac{1}{c_h}} \]
\[ = 1 + \frac{-\lambda_r}{\theta \frac{1}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I}} \theta^2 \]
\[ = 0\]

and

\[ \tau_{y_2}(l) = 1 + \frac{v'(\theta y_l^*)}{\theta u'(c_l^*)} = 1 + \frac{-\theta y_l^*}{\theta \frac{1}{c_h}} \]
\[ = 1 + \frac{-\lambda_r}{\theta \frac{1}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I}} \theta^2 \]
\[ = 2\lambda_I \frac{\theta^4 - 1}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I} > 0 \]

As we see, the wedge for the high ability types is zero, but positive for the low ability
For later use, we note that

\begin{align*}
y_i^* c_1^* &= 1 \\
y_h c_h^* &= \frac{\lambda_r}{1 + 2\lambda_I} \theta^2 \frac{1 + 2\lambda_I}{\lambda_r} = \theta^2 \\
y_l c_l^* &= \frac{\lambda_r}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I} \theta^2 \frac{1 - 2\lambda_I}{\lambda_r} = \frac{1 - 2\lambda_I}{\theta^2 (1 - 2\lambda_I \theta^{-4})}
\end{align*}

Before going to the implementation, note that if we eliminate the shadow value on the resource constraint, we have 7 equations and seven unknowns; getting rid of the shadow value on resources, we have 7 conditions and 7 unknowns

\begin{align*}
c_1 &= \frac{1}{y_1}, c_h = \frac{1 + 2\lambda_I}{y_1} \\
c_l &= \frac{1 - 2\lambda_I}{y_1}, y_h = \frac{y_1}{1 + 2\lambda_I} \theta^2 \\
y_l &= \frac{y_1}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_I} \theta^2, \\
0 &= y_1 + \frac{y_h + y_l}{2} - c_1 - \frac{c_h + c_l}{2} \\
0 &= \ln c_h - \ln c_l - \frac{y_h^2 - y_l^2}{2\theta^2}
\end{align*}

This does not have a nice closed form solution. However, setting $\theta = 1.1$, I numerically found the solution as $c_1 = 0.99871$, $y_1 = 1.0013$, $y_h = 1.1089$, $y_l = 0.88337$, $c_h = 1.0912$, $c_l = 0.90626$, $\lambda_I = 4.6286 \times 10^{-2}$.

As we see, high ability types consume more than low ability types. However, the former consumes less than their income and the latter more, i.e., there is redistribution.

---

\textsuperscript{7} The wedge, asymptotes to infinity as $\lambda_I$ approach $\frac{\theta^4}{2}$. Can you explain?
3.3 Implementation

It is tempting to interpret the wedges as taxes and subsidies. However, this is not entirely correct since the wedges in general are functions of all taxes. Furthermore, while there is typically a unique set of wedges this is generically not true for the taxes. As we have discussed above, many different tax systems might implement the optimal allocation. One example is the draconian, use 100% taxation for every choice except the optimal ones.

Only by putting additional restrictions is the implementing tax system found. Let us consider a combination if linear labor taxes and savings taxes that together with type specific transfers implement the allocation in the example. To do this, consider the individual problem,

$$\max_{c_1,y_1,s,y_h,y_l,c_h,c_l} \ln (c_1) - \frac{y_1^2}{2} + \left( \frac{\ln c_h - \frac{(y_h)^2}{2}}{2} + \frac{\ln c_l - \frac{(y_l)^2}{2}}{2} \right)$$

s.t. $0 = y_1 (1 - \tau_1) - c_1 - s + T$

$0 = y_h (1 - \tau_h) + s (1 - \tau_{s,h}) - c_h + T_h$

$0 = y_l (1 - \tau_l) + s (1 - \tau_{s,l}) - c_l + T_l$

with Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_1, \lambda_h$ and $\lambda_r$. 
First order conditions for the individuals are:

\[
\frac{1}{c_1} = \lambda_1, y_1 = \lambda_1 (1 - \tau_1) \\
\lambda_1 = \lambda_h (1 - \tau_{s,h}) + \lambda_l (1 - \tau_{l,h}) \\
\frac{y_h}{2\theta^2} = \lambda_h (1 - \tau_h), \frac{\theta^2 y_l}{2} = \lambda_l (1 - \tau_l) \\
\frac{1}{2c_h} = \lambda_h, \frac{1}{2c_l} = \lambda_l
\]

(43)

Using this, we see that

\[
\frac{1}{c_1} = \frac{1}{2c_h} (1 - \tau_{s,h}) + \frac{1}{2c_l} (1 - \tau_{l,h})
\]

Setting,

\[
\tau_{s,h} = -2\lambda_I \\
\tau_{s,l} = 2\lambda_I.
\]

this gives

\[
\frac{1}{c_1} = \frac{1}{2c_h} (1 + 2\lambda_I) + \frac{1}{2c_l} (1 - 2\lambda_I)
\]

which is satisfied if we plug in the optimal allocation \(c_h^* = c_1^* (1 + 2\lambda_I)\) and \(c_l^* = c_1^* (1 - 2\lambda_I)\)

\[
\frac{1}{c_1^*} = \frac{1 + 2\lambda_I}{2c_1^* (1 + 2\lambda_I)} + \frac{1 - 2\lambda_I}{2c_1^* (1 - 2\lambda_I)}
\]

Note that the expected capital income tax rate is zero, but it will make savings lower
than without any taxes. Why?

Similarly, by noting from (42) that in the optimal second best allocation, we want

\[ y_1 c_1 = y^*_1 c^*_1 = 1, \]

which is implemented by \( \tau_1 = 0 \). For the high ability type, the second best allocation in (42) is that \( y^*_h c^*_h = \theta^2 \), which is implemented by \( \tau_h = 0 \) since (45) implies that \( y_h c_h = \theta^2 (1 - \tau_h) \).

For the low ability type, we want \( y^*_l c^*_l = \frac{1 - 2 \lambda_I}{\theta(1 - 2 \lambda_I \theta^{-4})} \). From (45), we know \( y_l c_l = \frac{1 - \eta}{\theta^2} \), so we solve

\[
\frac{1 - \tau_l}{\theta^2} = \frac{1 - 2 \lambda_I}{\theta^2 (1 - 2 \lambda_I \theta^{-4})} \\
\Rightarrow \tau_l = 2 \lambda_I \frac{\theta^4 - 1}{\theta^4 - 2 \lambda_I}. 
\]

Note that if \( \lambda_I = \frac{1}{2} \), \( \tau_l = 1 \). I.e., the tax rate is 100%. There is no point going higher than that, so \( \lambda_I \) cannot be higher than \( \frac{1}{2} \).

Finally, to find the complete allocation, we use the budget constraints. We do not need to use any transfers in the first period. Thus

\[
T_h = c_h - y_h - (y_1 - c_1) (1 - \tau_{s,h}) \\
T_l = c_l - y_l - (y_1 - c_1) (1 - \tau_{s,l}) 
\]

We should note that \( T_l > T_h \) is consistent with incentive compatibility. Why? Because if you claim to be a low ability type you will have to pay a high labor income tax which is
bad if you are high ability and earn a high income. Thus, by taxing high income lower, we can have a transfer system that transfers more to the low ability types.

To find expressions for the transfers I need to use numerical methods. Using the results for $\theta = 1.1$, we have

$$T_h = 1.0912 - 1.1089 - (1.0013 - 0.99871) \left(1 + 2 \times 4.6286 \times 10^{-2}\right)$$

$$= -0.0205$$

$$T_l = 0.90626 - 0.88337 - (1.0013 - 0.99871) \left(1 - 2 \times 4.6286 \times 10^{-2}\right)$$

$$= 0.0205$$

### 3.3.1 Third best – laissez faire.

The allocation in without any government involvements is easily found by setting all taxes to zero.

$$\frac{1}{c_1} = \lambda_1, y_1 = \lambda_1$$

$$\lambda_1 = \lambda_h + \lambda_l$$

$$\frac{y_h}{2\theta^2} = \lambda_h, \quad \frac{\theta^2 y_l}{2} = \lambda_l$$

$$\frac{1}{2c_h} = \lambda_h, \quad \frac{1}{2c_l} = \lambda_l$$
Using these and the budget constraints, we get

\[ y_1 = \frac{1}{c_1} \]
\[ \frac{1}{c_1} = \frac{1}{2c_h} + \frac{1}{2c_l} \]
\[ \frac{y_h}{2\theta^2} = \frac{1}{2c_h} \]
\[ \frac{\theta^2 y_l}{2} = \frac{1}{2c_l} \]
\[ y_1 = c_1 + s \]
\[ y_h + s = c_h \]
\[ y_l + s = c_l \]

which implies

\[ c_1 + s = \frac{1}{c_1} \]
\[ \frac{1}{c_1} = \frac{1}{2c_h} + \frac{1}{2c_l} \]
\[ c_h = \frac{1}{2} s + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{s^2 + 4\theta^2} \]
\[ c_l = \frac{1}{2} s \theta + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{s^2 \theta^2 + 4} \]

I did not find an analytical solution to this, but setting \( \theta = 1.1 \) I found the solution
\( c_1 = 0.99775, c_h = 1.1023, s = 4.5045 \times 10^{-3}, c_l = 0.91135, y_1 = 1.0023, y_h = 1.1068, y_l = 0.91585. \)

As we see, consumption is lower in the first period and labor supply is higher than in
second best. Consumption of high ability types is higher and labor supply lower than in second best. For low ability types, consumption is actually higher in *laissez faire* but also labor supply. The second period welfare of low ability types is higher in second best (−0.285 vs. −0.300 15).

### 3.3.2 Means tested system

Suppose now we want to implement the optimal allocation without a savings-tax but using an asset tested disability transfer instead. That is we set

\[
T_l = \begin{cases} 
T_l & \text{if } s \leq \bar{s} \\
-T_l & \text{else.}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \bar{T} \) is sufficiently large to deter savings above \( \bar{s} \). We set \( \bar{s} \) equal to the first best \( y_1^* - c_1^* \).

Without a savings tax, the cap on savings will clearly bind due to the inverse Euler equation. The problem of the individual is therefore

\[
\max_{c_1, y_1, s, y_h, y_l, c_h, c_l} \ln (c_1) - \frac{y_1^2}{2} + \left( \frac{\ln c_h - \left( \frac{y_h}{2} \right)^2}{2} + \frac{\ln c_l - \left( \frac{y_l}{2} \right)^2}{2} \right)
\]

s.t.

\[
0 = y_1 (1 - \tau_1) - c_1 - \bar{s} + T_l
\]

\[
0 = y_h (1 - \tau_h) + \bar{s} - c_h + T_h
\]

\[
0 = y_l (1 - \tau_l) + \bar{s} - c_l + T_l
\]
First order conditions for the individuals are;

\[ c_1; \frac{1}{c_1} = \lambda_1 \]

\[ y_1; y_1 = \lambda_1 (1 - \tau_1) \]

\[ y_h; \frac{y_h}{2\theta^2} = \lambda_h (1 - \tau_h) \quad (45) \]

\[ y_l; \frac{\theta^2 y_l}{2} = \lambda_l (1 - \tau_l) \]

\[ c_h; \frac{1}{2c_h} = \lambda_h \]

\[ c_l; \frac{1}{2c_l} = \lambda_l \]

giving

\[ 1 - \tau_1 = c_1 y_1 \quad (46) \]

\[ \theta^2 (1 - \tau_h) = c_h y_h \quad (47) \]

\[ \frac{1 - \tau_l}{\theta^2} = c_l y_l \]

We want

\[ 1 = c_1 y_1 \Rightarrow \tau_1 = 1. \]

We also want

\[ c_h y_h = \theta^2, \]

\[ c_l y_l = \frac{1 - 2\lambda_l}{\theta^2 (1 - 2\lambda_l \theta^{-4})} \quad (48) \]
requiring

\[ \tau_h = 0, \]
\[ \tau_l = 2\lambda_l \frac{\theta^4 - 1}{\theta^4 - 2\lambda_l}, \]

mimicking the results above.

Golosow and Tsyvinski (2006), extend this model and calibrate it to the US. They assume people live until 75 years and start working at 25. The calibrate the probability of becoming permanently disabled for each age group. The problem is substantially simplified by the assumption that disability is permanent. They find the second best allocation in the same way as we have done here working backwards from the last period. As here, they show that the optimal allocation is implementable with transfers with asset limits and taxes on working people. The able should have zero marginal income taxes as in our example. In contrast to our example, the low ability types here have zero labor income and thus face no labor income tax.

An important finding is that asset limits are age dependent and increasing over (most of) the working life.

### 3.4 Time consistency

Under the Mirrlees approach, the government announces a menu of taxes or of consumption baskets. People then make choices that in equilibrium reveal their true types (abilities) to the government. Suppose the government could then re-optimize. Would it like to do this?
The problem is more severe in a dynamic setting provided abilities are persistent. Why?

In a finite horizon economy, there might only be very bad equilibria (Roberts, 84). But better equilibria might arise in infinite horizon.

Fig. 2.—Optimal disability programs with asset testing (solid lines) and without asset testing (dashed lines): a, consumption; b, labor; c, disability transfers; d, asset limits.