Professor John Hassler, IIES,
The key problem we will study is when the planner wants to redistribute from high ability to low ability individuals and or provide a public good but has imperfect information of the true ability of individuals. We will start with a traditional approach where taxes are restricted to be linear and lump sum individual specific transfers are not allowed. After that we will remove this restrictions and instead model micro-foundations for why any type specific tax cannot be implemented. Instead we assume that the planner/government cannot observe ability and effort of individuals so that the latter can pretend to be someone else. By doing so, a better understanding of the fundamental trade-oﬀ between incentives and redistribution can be achieved. The static analysis of this problem starts with the classic Mirrlees model. We will then study more recent results in an emerging literature called the “New Dynamic Public Finance”.
1 Introductory graduate macroeconomics.
2 Dynamic optimization – knowledge of standard dynamic programming.
Starred articles below are recommended to everyone.
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. “The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation”. Journal of Public Economics 6 (1976): 55–75
Boadway, Robin and Pierre Pestieau, 2002, “Indirect Taxation and Redistribution: The Scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem”, Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1005.
Saez, Emmanuel, (2001), “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates”, Review of Economic Studies 68 (1), 205–229.
*Golosov, Mikhail, Aleh Tsyvinski and Iván Werning, “New Dynamic Public Finance: A User’s Guide”, Chapter in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21 (2007), Daron Acemoglu, Kenneth Rogoff and Michael Woodford, editors (p. 317 - 388)
*Golosov, Mikhail, and Aleh Tsyvinski, (2006), “Designing Optimal Disability Insurance”, Journal of Political Economy, 114:2.
*Diamond, Peter and Emmanuel Saez, (2011),“The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, CES-IFO WP
*Fahri, Emmanuel and Iván Werning, (2013), “Capital Taxation: Quantitative Explorations of the Inverse Euler Equation” , JPE forthcoming.
Golosov, M., N. Kocherlakota, and A. Tsyvinski (2003), “Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation”. Review of Economic Studies 70, 569-588
Townsend, Robert , (1982), “Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 6
Kapička, Marek, 2006, "The Dynamics of Optimal Taxation when Human Capital is Endogenous”, mimeo, UCSB.